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The Global Economic Crisis  
 and Latin America’s Economic Prospects 
 
Outline  I 
•  PART I – The Global Economic/Financial Crisis 
•  Factors Leading to the Global Crisis 
•  Transmission Mechanisms 
•  Patterns of Recovery 
•  Alternative Scenarios 
•  Short/Medium Term Assessments 
•  Current Risks – Increased Pessimism 
•  March 2012 Up-Dates 
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Outline II 
•  PART II – Latin America’s Economic Prospects 
•  Latin America Overview 
•  Recent Patterns of Growth 
•  Potential Problems  






•  China’s Economic Relationship With Latin America 




Economic Crisis and Security Threats 
“The global recession is America’s primary near-term security 
concern.”  
Admiral Blair – Director of National Intelligence 
(February 2009) 
 
“The single biggest threat to national security is the 
national debt.” 
Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the  Joint Chiefs of Staff 
  (August 2010) 
 
“I have to confess, I paid no attention to this (economics) as a 
cadet and have done nothing to increase my awareness of 
economics issues between age 22 and 59.  I should have 
paid attention.” 
  General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 





The World Economic Crisis 
With regard to the ongoing economic crisis, several 
generalizations are possible: 
•  The current crisis while severe, shares many 
characteristics and patterns associated with past crisis 
•  Its origins and underlying causes follow a familiar 
pattern --- with several unique twists 
•  Just when it appeared the crisis was coming to an end 
in 2010, it has flared up again with the prospects for 
the next several years, grim for the developed market 
economies (DMs) and highly uncertain for the 
emerging market economies (EMs). 
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Crisis: Beginnings 
•  The Environment: 
•  Long period of easy credit, low interest rates 
•  The trigger: 
•  Higher than expected defaults on U.S. subprime mortgage loans 
(bad banking?) 
•  The propagation channel: 
•  From real estate markets  
•  to asset-backed securities markets  
•  to bank balance sheets  
•  to inter-bank funding markets  
•  to the broader credit markets  
•  to the real economy and  
•  across borders. 
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Crisis: Initial Stages 
The early stages of the crisis : 
•  Summer 2007 – initial phase 
•  Subprime mortgage crisis,  
•  Beginning of collapse of stock exchange 
•  Early 2008 – growing stress in advanced countries 
•  Systemic crisis of financial intuitions in US 
•  Economic slowing down in U.S. EU and Japan, but 
•  Overheating inmost emerging markets (high commodity prices, 
weak US dollar accelerating inflation  
•  Summer 2008 – breaking point 
•  Bursting commodity and other bubbles 
•  Global crisis of financial institutions (bankruptcy of Lehman) 
•  Recession in developed countries 
•  Fall 2008 – crisis hits emerging market economies. 
•  Effects of the crisis world-wide and more severe than in past 
modern recessions – severe because of wide-spread financial 
institution’s holding of bad paper. 8 
Crisis Transmission  and Responses 
9 
Crisis Response 
•  Not much coordinated activity in responding to crisis, 
because of incompatible conceptual frameworks for 
understanding its root causes 
•  U.S. policy makers believe that trade surplus countries pursued 
policies that created global imbalances – excess savings in 
China – fixed exchange rate 
•  Europeans believed that the root cause of the crisis was 
excessively deregulated financial systems 
•  China feels reserve status of dollar created the imbalances to 
develop to unsustainable levels 
•  Therefore responses not coordinated 
•  Fiscal stimulus in some countries 
•  Expansive monetary policy, central bank asset purchases 
•  Support (IMF) to vulnerable countries 
•  Attempts through WTO at preempting protectionism 10 
Four Early Economic/Security Scenarios 
In late 2008, early 2009 four economic crisis/security scenarios 
were getting considerable attention –  
•  The Terrorist Opportunity – terrorists seeing the U.S. economy 
melting down calculate that a strike could have a force 
multiplier because of the already skittish stock market. 
•  The China Syndrome – Chinese own more than $500 billion in 
US. Treasury bonds, and billions more in other U.S. debt.  While 
they would not dump them on the market to disrupt the U.S. 
economy, they have leverage over U.S. decisions on interest 
rates, exchange rate decisions. 
•  A Japanese “Lost Decade” – U.S. economy flat in the water for 
a decade or so – government runs up debt with no stimulating 
effect on the economy 
•  The Alternative-Dollar Nightmare – countries refuse to hold 
dollar reserves.  Dollar crashes and U.S economy along with it. 
•  None happened – Lesson – Much More Stability in Global 
System than Commonly Believed 
11 
Global Financial Crisis: Initial Security Concerns 
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Factors Contributing to Stability 
Why didn’t the global system collapse when many in late 2008 were 
predicting its immediate demise? 
•  Revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize 
themselves on their own 
•  Governments learning from the great depression responded quickly 
through central banks and treasuries 
•  The extensive social safety nets across the industrialized world 
cushioned the pain 
•  Global system is simply more resilient than we imagined – 
three major reinforcing elements  producing stability 
•  Spread of great power peace – relatively little friction between major 
nations – rare in history – true global economy 
•  Relatively low rates of inflation – can plan for the future  
•  Technological connectivity – information revolution crated a deeply 
connected global system – most nations have benefitted greatly from 
the system – cautious about appeals to nationalism or acts that would 




U.S. Patterns of Recovery I 
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U.S. Patterns of Recovery II 
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Crisis: Potential U.S. Growth 
Under all the standard scenarios, the crisis will have a 
marked impact on U.S. potential growth: 
•  The recession, the rising U.S. debt levels and tighter 
financial conditions will hurt investment, keeping 
capital formation well below rates in pre-crisis years 
•  Resulting high and more-persistent-than-usual unemployment 
will lower potential growth 
•  IMF estimates that U..S. potential output will average about 
1.5% over the next five years.  
•  This compares with an estimated 2.0 percent anticipated 
average in the absence of the crisis 
•  By 2014 the potential output expected to be abut 6 percent 
below what it would have been in the absence of a  crisis 
•  Slower U.S. growth will suppress recoveries in key 
U.S. trading partners. 
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Declining Long-Term Growth 
18 








2011 -- Increased Pessimism 
Since early 2011 most forecasting groups have continually 
downgraded their projected rates of recovery for most 
areas of the world.  Many factors are involved: 
•  A lack of resolution of old threats to the recovery 
•  The need for additional deleveraging in DM public sectors 
•  Lingering problems in the U.S. housing sector -- poses risks to 
wealth, personal consumption, and the balance sheets of 
financial institutions 
•  Inadequate rebalancing of global demand, adding to excess 
capacity 
•  Still-high commodity prices that have dampened 
consumption and complicated monetary policy in some 
countries 
•  Rising risks of a short-term hit to confidence – markets very 
nervous 
•  Situation complicated by the flair-up of problems in the 
Eurozone 
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Near-Term Leading Indicators All Down 
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Slow-Down in Growth: Advanced Economies 
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IMF Growth Tracker 
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IMF October 2011 Assessment I 
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IMF October 2011 Assessment II 
28 
IMF October 2011 Assessment III 
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Commodity Price Changes: April vs. October 2011 
30 
Alternative Scenarios 
There are several possible scenarios for the global economy.  
•  Benign – Global growth picks up again before end of year 
Commodity prices stabilize and weaker inflation relieves 
pressure on consumers and central banks 
•  This boosts confidence in governments’ ability to manage their debts 
and encourages a rally in global equity markets 
•  Muddling Through – Economic activity remains subdued 
despite falling commodity prices and inflation.  
•  The debt crisis escalates in the euro-area periphery and banking system 
sucking in Italy and requiring further fundraising by the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and IMF. 
•  Double-Dip Recession – Growth slackens markedly in 
leading emerging market economies and the developed 
world slips back into recession.  
•  Commodity prices tumble and threat of deflation reappears in some 
countries.  Tensions over sovereign debt and austerity policies cause 




Probably of stagnation or double dip scenario is higher (60%) than 
before (15-20% in the spring and 30-40% in July), as negative 
macroeconomic surprises and faltering confidence continue to  
show up in the data 
•  The slowdown is more than a soft patch, and policy makers 
(particularly in DMs) will find themselves without policy bullets or 
unwilling to use the ones they have 
•  Possible triggers include policy mistakes (or inadequate policy 
responses) or a major financing shock stemming from disorderly 
default by sovereigns or a systemic financial crisis 
•  The recovery remains policy dependent in DMs that are relying on 
ZIRP and withdrawing from fiscal stimulus packages. 
•  If DMs were to experience sharp demand destruction, EMs would 
suffer as real economic and financial links exacerbate the ongoing 
slowdown, though  most (especially in Asia and Latin America) 
have policy space for stimulus.   
•  Emerging Europe requires more balance sheet repair and retains 
less policy space. 
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Medium Term Assessment 
In the medium term (five year horizon) a weak U-Shaped 
recovery amid balance sheet repair is the most likely 
scenario 
•  However given the macroeconomic deterioration, the 
political impasse in the United States and continued 
uncertainty in the EZ, the risk of falling into a protracted 
recession with inadequate policy responses is high (45%). 
•  As gradual deleveraging continues, investors will search for 
yield to maximize real returns, bringing capital to Ems as 
well as commodities, and adding to EM monetary trilemmas 
•  Regulatory changes encourage the buildup of leverage 
outside investment banks (in the shadow banking system) 
and in EMs with space to borrow more.  
•  Although EMs like Brazil and Turkey still have low overall 
outstanding credit, debt-service costs could dampen 
consumption 
•  Slow policy normalizaion will plant the seeds in the next 
crisis in EMs and EMs. 
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Possible Perfect Storm 
Several coincident stresses raise short- and medium-term risks 
•  Amid U.S. cyclical slowdown, political gridlock stands in the way of 
necessary stimulus and reforms to deal with underlying 
vulnerabilities (e.g., the housing market). 
•  EZ policy makers are running out of time. Despite more significant 
moves from the European Commission/ECB, debt levels are still 
too high, raising the risk of a country exiting in the medium term. 
•  The end of the Chinese investment bubble is a medium term 
(post-2013) risk, but DM recession could bring the risks forward. 
The end of China’s investment and lending binge will weigh on 
domestic and global growth. 
•  Global rebalancing has been insufficient .  Excess capacity could 
derail investment 
•  Governance Traps may halt growth in one or more Ems at a critical 
juncture – around per capita income $10,000 to $15,000. 
•  Sudden  and prolonged spike in oil prices  -- Middle East conflict, 




Eurozone Facing a Number of Headwinds: 
•  The Slowing Core:  
•  Can no longer look to Germany and France to save the region with their growth. 
•  Fiscal austerity:  
•  Will Take years to see results of structural reforms that can boost growth in 
periphery.  Fiscal austerity will keep these economies in a deepening recession 
•  Politics: 
•  Public backlash against austerity and reforms – could unsettle bond markets 
•  The Banks:  
•  The negative feedback loop between the economy, banks and the sovereign 
debt only gets worse with a slowing economy. 
•  The ECB:  
•  Bold but overwhelmed. With slowing economic growth, ECB’s responses too 
little, too late 
•  Overvalued Currency:  
•  Devaluation not occurring fast enough 
•  Greece:  
•  Disorderly default is likely and could disrupt the EZ.  
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Recently Brighter Picture for U.S. 
36 
RGE: GDP, CPI Forecasts 
37 
March 2012 Update I 
•  Roubini’s take on the current situation: 
•  Skeptical of many recent assessments expressing optimism about 
the global economic outlook 
•  Four fundamental global economic risks still at work: 
•  1. U.S. economy is more fragile than it appears on the surface – 
improvement in jobs tied to three temporary factors: 
•  Unseasonably warm weather,  
•  Delayed effect of lower oil and gasoline prices in 2011  
•  The delays in the foreclosure process that have slowed down the rate of 
foreclosures. 
•  2. Recession in the Eurozone Periphery set to worsen 
•  Massive fiscal drag (austerity programs),  
•  Credit contraction still underway,  
•  Euro strengthening, -- no problem for Germany, but hurts periphery 
•  Rising oil prices (periphery highly dependent on Iranian oil).   
•  High political risks – series of elections in EZ that may result in radically 
altered policies – increased political pressure to leave Eurozone. 
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March 2012 Update II 
•  3. China is Slowing 
•  Export growth has been slowing sharply, turning negative not just to 
the EZ periphery but the core as well 
•  Residential investment and commercial real estate activity slowing 
sharply 
•  Infrastructure investment down 
•  Bankrupt Railway Ministry delaying many high speed projects 
•  Leadership transition mean many critical reforms of state enterprises 
will have to be delayed a year or two  
•  If structural shift from an unbalanced  and unsustainable growth model 
is postponed to long – hard landing in 2013 or 2014. 
•  4. Oil price shock Risks as Geopolitical Risks in Middle East Mount 
•  Israeli threat to attack Iran 
•  Iran back to the wall with sanctions taking heavy toll – could react by 
increasing tensions in the Gulf 
•  U.S. and Israel may decide later in the year to attack Iran 39 
Part II: Latin America 
•  Latin America – Overview 
•  Country Situations 
•  Mexico – Slow Decline and Instability 
•  Argentina – Unsustainable Expansion 
•  Cuba – Institutional Uncertainty 
•  Venezuela – Stagnation 
•  Brazil – Underperformance 
•  Economic Links to China 
•  The Future – Overall Assessment 
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Latin America: Overview 
•  If the global economy proves resilient, economic trends in 
Latin America appear favorable 
•  Growth is expected to stay robust, though it decelerated in 
second half of 2011 and is projected to slow further in 2012 
•  Unemployment is gradually declining, foreign investment 
growth has continued and fiscal balances remain solid 
•  With commodity exports accounting for a large share of 
GDP in Latin America (10 % of GDP in South America), the 
region has benefitted greatly from high commodity prices 
•  Agriculture and energy prices in dollars (adjusted by the 
U.S. consumer Price index) have increased 147 and 400 
percent since 2002. 
•  The IMF’s Price indices for food and industrial inputs (raw 
materials) both jumped by more than 20 percent in 2011 as 
compared to 2010 
•  Problem – Big External Risks – Problems in Eurozone, 
Slowdown in China/US --  41 
Latin America: Decelerating Growth 
42 
Latin America: Potential Problems I 
In dealing with potential external shocks, Latin American countries 
face a number of challenges: 
•  They are less fiscally prepared for adverse external conditions than 
in 2008-09 
•  Do not have the budgetary flexibility as in pre-2008 
•  Over 50% of Latin America exports are raw materials or manufactures 
based on natural resources 
•  Ten of the world’s 15 most unequal countries are in Latin America 
– additional strain on fiscal resources – start/stop policies 
•  One of the main factors contributing to the region’s recovery since 
2009 – trade with China also contains a potential risk to finances 
•  Slower growth in China would reduce both demand for LAC commodity 
exports and their international prices with a negative impact on fiscal 
revenues 
•  The nature of LAC’s recent recovery particularly in South America 
has tended to accentuate commodity dependence and their 
vulnerability to international cycles 
•  Undermines an earlier trend towards greater economic 
diversification and growth sustainability. 
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Latin America: Potential Problems II 
Other Challenges: 
•  While FDI has tented to increase this investment has been 
concentrated in natural resource sectors such as mining and 
hydrocarbons 
•  Combined with capital inflows attracted by the region’s 
growth and higher interest rates than in DM countries this 
has led to currency appreciation at the expense of the 
competitiveness of non-commodity export industries 
•  To reverse these patterns, LAC governments will need to 
develop new strategies in four key areas: 
•  1. Education – still lagging considerably behind OECD 
average in coverage and quality – 48% of  LAC 15-year olds 
do not reach minimum acceptable reading level 
(considerable variation between countries) – compared to 
less than 20% in OECD countries 
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Latin America: Potential Problems III 
•  2. Infrastructure   lagging considerably behind competitors. Would 
have to commit 9% of GDP annually to infrastructure through 
2020 to close gap with South East Asia, but in 2007-09 only 
invested 2% of GDP 
•  Innovation – Spending on R&D reached 0.6% of GDP in LAC in 
2008 as compared with OECD average of 2.3% -- in contrast to 
industrialized countries this is funded largely by the public rather 
than private sector 
•  Tax Systems – average tax burden in LAC 2008 19.3% GDP 
compared to OECD average of 35% (varies from 33.6% Brazil to 
12.9% in Guatemala – not structured well to assist in reducing 
inequality 
•  Assessment: despite LAC success in addressing and recovering 
from 2008-09 crisis, remains vulnerable to external conditions 
•  Because of this vulnerability and its impact on fiscal revenues, 
limits region’s ability to address related challenges of economic 
diversification, competitiveness and income distribution.  
•  This limited capability has been compounded by the inability of the 
LAC countries to make significant progress in improved 
governance or economic reforms during the period of high growth 
2002-2008. 
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Progress in Regulatory Quality 
46 




































Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2010
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Progress in Overall Economic Freedom 
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Source: Heritage House Index of Economic Freedom, 2012
Latin America Growth and Risk Assessment 
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Mexico: Slow Decline I 
Mexico’s proximity to the U.S. should have allowed it to be 
much more wealthy than it is: 
•  Country has been characterized by slow growth: 
•  On average annual GDP growth increased 3.4% from 
1971-2010 
•  Slowing to 2.4% from 1981-2010 
•  Average annual GDP per capita increased only 0.5% 
between 1981-2010 
•  Global recession hit hard with GDP contracting by 6.5% 
in 2009 --  country will not recover to 2008 levels until 
later this year 
•  If country had maintained average growth during 1950s 
and 1960s 
•   GDP per capita would be at least twice the current level 
•   Above South Korea and similar to Portugal 49 
Mexico’s Slow Decline II 
Causes of decline 
•  Numerous policy errors 
•  Populist policies in early 1970s – inflationary pressures 
•  Mismanagement of oil wealth – use of oil revenues for social 
programs, not reinvestment in exploration and production 
•  Massive external debt 
•  Dysfunctional political system 
•  No new institutions since the demise of the PRI in 2000 
•  One term for politicians reduces accountability   
•  Severe Structural Impediments 
•  Poor education system – teachers’ union blocking reforms 
•  Rigid labor market – high costs of hiring and firing 
•  Restrictions on investments make it hard to attract sufficient 
foreign direct investment into key sectors -- energy 50 
Mexico’s Slow Decline III 
Political elites fail to agree of structural reforms because 
various macroeconomic indicators give mistaken 
impression that the economy is doing relatively well: 
•  Low inflation has been the norm since mid-1990s 
•  U.S. Slowdowns, not domestic factors explain recessions 
in 2001-02 and 2009 
•  Public finances posted small deficits and even surplus 
since the 1990s 
•  Balance of payments shows small and manageable 
balances 
•  Economy grew around 5.1% in 2010 when 3.0% was 
forecast – mainly just catch-up after the severe recession. 
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 Instability in Mexico  
Mexico faces a number of challenges in the near term: 
•  Economy may be developing a vicious cycle of slower 
growth,  stagnant reforms, instability, and declining 
growth: 
•  Faster than expected declining oil production, 
•  low tax base, over dependence on oil revenues  may lead to fiscal crisis 
stress 
•  Political deadlock make needed reforms nearly impossible 
•  Slow recovery of the U.S economy – increased competition from China  
•  Limited competition causes a chronic productivity gap with other 
emerging countries – loss of export markets 
•  Problems now compounded with deteriorating security 
situation 
•  Higher levels of violence, with more frequent confrontations 
between drug cartels and local authorities  
•  Takes heavy toll on investment and tourism further 
suppressing economic recovery. 
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Mexico: Prospects 2012 
Elections will dominate in 2012: 
•  PRI is expected to win the presidency 
•  War against drug cartels may radically alter campaign and 
election dynamics with political assassinations possible 
•  Calderon administration’s final year – no reform progress 
•  Low inflation and stable external accounts should ensure a 
smooth economic transition, but growth will remain 
lackluster at a little over 3%. 
•  Domestic demand may be gaining some strength supported 
by stronger than expected U.S. activity 
•  Downside risks to global growth continue to threaten 
recovery 
•  Public finances remain dangerously reliant on oil revenues – 
any plunge in oil prices would spark a fiscal crisis. 
•  Lackluster economic growth and a war against drug cartels 
that seems unwinnable will be the chief challenges faced by 
the new president. 53 
Mexico: Growth and Risk Assessment 
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Argentina’s Unsustainable Expansion I 
Argentina has been held up as a model for Greece: 
•  Instead of the usual prescription of austerity, the 
government has pursued expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policies. 
•  Fortunate to hit a commodity boom which brought in 
windfall foreign exchange earnings used to build up 
reserves. 
•  Rapid rates of growth (7.6% per annum) since devaluating 
its currency and defaulting on its debts after the 2001-02 
crisis 
•  However because of its debt defaults the country has been 
frozen out of international capital markets 
•  Because international borrowing is not an option the 
country had to maintain large levels of F/X reserves 
through balance of payments surpluses 
•  Meant keeping a weak currency to maintain 
competitiveness in export markets 55 
Argentina’s Unsustainable Expansion II 
Growth model is hitting diminishing returns 
•  Attempts to keep very competitive with overvalued 
exchange rate meant buying up dollars, but could not 
prevent the resulting growth in money supply 
•  Inflationary pressures building up, suppressed by price 
controls and misleading estimates of the price index. 
•  Price controls on energy have reduced productive supplies 
as have export taxes on agricultural commodities. 
•  Diversion of resources from agriculture to industry has led 
to declining productivity. 
•  In the last several years increasing protectionism and 
capital controls introduced to conserve foreign exchange 
reserves 
•  Uncertainty over government policy and increased controls 
have resulted in capital flight and a sharp fall in foreign 
exchange reserves 
•  Massive subsidies for energy users reached US 8 billion or 
2% of GDP 
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Argentina’s Unsustainable Expansion III 
Country on verge of sharp contraction: 
Days of public spending growth rates of 40%, real wage 
increases and negative interest rates are over. 
Government now up against a binding constraint – very 
limited in its ability to finance further spending 
Has started cutting subsidies for fiscal reasons 
Facing increased wage demands from strong unions 
Concerned that any slowdown in Chinese economy will 
result in commodity price declines 
Potential crisis in Europe will also have a major impact on 
the economy 
The recent slow-down in the Brazilian economy is also 
taking a heavy toll on manufactured exports. 
Country likely to find growth declines to considerably less 
than half that over the last 10 years. 57 
Argentina: Growth and Risk Assessment 
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Uncertainty in Cuba I 
The Cuban economy is going through a period of uncertainty  
•  The global crisis hit Cuba hard with very low rates of 
growth in the last several years. 
•  The government does not have sufficient resources to 
maintain the old Communist system 
•  Since taking over from his brother Fidel, President Raul 
Castro has prepared Cubans for the need for economic 
efficiency and cutting excessive state spending. 
•  China has become Cuba’s top creditor – nearly $4 billion in 
loans, but not open ended 
•  Raul Castro is tying the country’s fate to an economic 
reform process inspired by the Chinese model 
•  One plan was to cut 500,000 state employees by March 
2011 and another 800,000 later. 
•   An expanding private sector was expected to absorb these 
workers. 
59 
Cuba: Recent Rates of Growth 
60 
Uncertainty in Cuba II 
Government’s private sector plans are vague 
•  Small scale cooperatives are to be created, particularly in the 
service sector 
•  About 250,000 new licenses for self employment will be issued 
– along lines during the mid-1990s crisis 
•  Conservatives in the party see the private sector as a 
necessary emergency measure – a politically dangerous evil to 
be kept small and eliminated when state finances allow. 
•  Reform forces see “market socialism” in which the private 
sector is a key driver of the economy 
•  Most likely a continuing leadership tug-of-war over the need to 
control and limit the private sector is more likely than an all out 
move to market socialism. 
•  In the short run partially dismantling the paternalist state and 
loss of state employment will bring widespread anxiety and 
uncertainty which could turn into wide-spread frustration 
threatening to disrupt social stability  61 
Uncertainty in Cuba III 
To date little progress – liberalizing reforms are advancing slowly 
•  Reform is still very piecemeal 
•  Private sector expansion so far has been vary limited 
•  Plans to dismiss state employees have been largely halted until 
the private sector’s absorption capacity grows. 
•  With Hugo Chavez’s health condition uncertain, country faces 
prospect of loosing vital Venezuelan subsidies 
•  Production remains sluggish, inflation is up and corruption is 
eroding regime legitimacy. 
•  Anti-corruption drive is only adding to popular cynicism about 
elites rather than generating trust for the regime 
•  Still reform approval has convinced China to increase economic 
engagement in Cuba 
•  China now key economic partner.  While trade with Venezuela has 
stagnated in recent years trade with China now up to 1.8 $billion  
•  China particularly involved in onshore oil drilling and offshore 
exploration 
•  Technical assistance and credit lines directly target areas related 
to the reform process. 
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Stagnation in Venezuela I 
Chavez health will remain key issue: 
•  Chavez continues to be disassociated in the popular 
mind from the failings of his government 
•  There has been a steady decline in all measures of 
governance and economic freedom under Chavez. 
•  Institutional capacity is the lowest in Latin America 
•  Bottlenecks, controls, distortions and corruption that 
characterize economy and public policy 
•  Make ambitious 2012 targets for housing, construction, 
energy generation and improved supply of goods 
unavailable 
•  Chavez has been able to offset this with this 
government’s record on social spending 
•  This dramatically lowered inequality and social exclusion 
over the last 12 years and helped maintain his popularity. 63 
 Stagnation in Venezuela II 
Economy Will Remain Under Stress 
•  With oil prices unlikely to increase dramatically over a 
longer period of time, declining oil production with 
expanded expenditures will produce budgetary stress 
•  Expropriations/Nationalizations will continue, with the 
government paying in bolivares-denominated public bonds 
•  An effort/collaboration will be demanded of the private sector with 
profit margins forced down. 
•  The government will not have the resources to continue being the big 
employer in the economy 
•  Sustainability of the Chavista growth model is in doubt 
•  Based on increased consumption, but not supported by higher 
production and private investment. 
•  The government will not be able to maintain its “illusion of harmony.”  
Already marked increase in crime. 
•  With massive capital flight,  the country will likely become 
increasingly dependent on China for capital, technical 
advice and equipment – Iran? 
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Venezuela, Growth and Risk Assessment 
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 Brazilian Take-Off 
The country has emerged as one of the BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India 
and China.  Enablers: 
•  Sound macroeconomic policies – fiscal responsibility 
•  Reasonably open trade and domestic polices 
•  Political transitions that don’t disrupt the growth process 
•  New growth phase began under Fernando Henrique Cardoso and 
the inflation busting Real Plan of 1994 
•  Began enacting long list of strategic reforms enabling sustainable faster 
rates of economic growth 
•  Enabled the country to come out of the crisis much more rapidly than 
anticipated – taking advantage of trade with China 
•  Major oil discoveries in addition to a new commodity boom should help 
accelerate growth 
•  Since 2003 more than 32 million people (total population 198 million) 
entered middle class with 20 million rising above poverty 
•  May use increased economic strength to counter-balance U.S. 
influence in the region, especially in trade 
•  However recent developments have raised questions as to the 
country’s future growth 
66 
Brazilian Underperformance 
After recovering quickly from the 2008-09 crisis, growing at 7.5% in 
2010, the economy has declined rapidly 
•  The economy experienced a sharp deceleration in 2011 with 
depressed demand 
•  As consumer and business confidence remain depressed, private 
sector credit has also reversed and growth rates are diminishing 
•  Although the exchange rate has weakened, it is still to strong, 
putting manufacturing at a distinct disadvantage – variant of the 
Dutch Disease. 
•  Slack growth in manufacturing at same time high demand for 
services has created a type of stagflation --  
•  Inflation will continue to be a problem due to structural factors – 
low productivity rates, elevated salary increases, infrastructure 
bottlenecks and import restrictions 
•  While the economy has picked up a bit forecasts put growth in 
2012 at 3.5% maximum or possibly 2.9% 
•  How fast Brazil can grow and for how long remains a question due 
to a number of structural impediments that will constrain the 
economy unless addressed. 67 
Brazil: Structural Problems 
•  Because savers do not view Brazilian and non-Brazilian assets as 
perfect substitutes, low domestic savings mean perennially very 
high (nominal and real) interest rates. 
•  To offset the impact on investment of high capital costs, the state-
owned Brazilian Development Bank offers tens of billions of dollars 
in long term loans at zero or negative interest rates – 
unfortunately those who receive the loans are not necessarily the 
most productive 
•  Both public and private sector under save, but the government’s 
dearth savings is the bigger problem 
•  Not do to lack of revenue – tax receipts as a share of GDP are the 
highest in Latin America 
•  Problem is state invests little because it has to many inflexible 
current expenditures 
•  Public sector pensions account for 6.8% GDP and are 2.5 times 
higher than private pensions 
•  Leaves little for infrastructure needed to create new exports and 
the higher paying jobs essential in reducing the country’s great 
income inequalities. 
•  Will require major reforms, but the political will may not be there. 
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Brazil: Sharp Deceleration in Demand 
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Brazil’s Uncertain Future 
Major concerns for the future 
•  The key constraint is lack of domestic savings.  
•  If Brazil raises its investment rate to 23% of GDP from 
today’s 19% (as it must to build World Cup infrastructure) 
it will have to run a current account deficit and rely on 
external savings equivalent to 3-4% GDP for years. 
•  That gap can be easily financed with today’s abundant 
liquidity, but a disorderly European default or eventual US 
monetary tightening could change that. 
•  There is a good possibility that the country’s recent 
commodity boom is an aberration which will soon shift as 
soon as China shifts transitions from its resource intensive 
growth model or as the economy begins to slow-down its 
growth 
•  A permanent decline in commodity prices would lead to 
currency depreciation and trigger negative wealth and 
income effects which would in turn adversely affect 
economic growth. 
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Latin America-China Economic Relations I 
Trade between China and LAC has been booming for a decade 
•  Within last 5 years bilateral trade has increased by over 160 
percent 
•  In period since financial crisis, China has become the 
number one trading partner of Brazil, Chile and Peru. 
•  Relationship not limited to trade: Chinese firms have 
dramatically stepped up FDI in the region 
•  In last two years China has become the top source of FDI in 
Brazil and Peru 
•  Pattern has been primarily driven by China’s expanding for 
Latin American mineral, agricultural and energy resources.   
•  Chinese manufactures to the region have grown 
dramatically  
•  Boom in trade and investment has not had an equal impact 
throughout. Exports to China largely concentrated in a small 
number of raw materials (copper, iron ore, soy and oil) from 
core group of countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru). 72 
China’s Share of LAC Exports: 2002, 2008 (%) 
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Latin America-China Economic Relations II 
•  Other countries like Mexico have a less complementary and 
more competitive relationship  
•  Even Brazil has found domestic manufacturers have come 
under heavy pressure from Chinese competition 
•  Relationship with China has produced high expectations but is 
giving way to rising anxieties 
•  During financial crisis China a ray of hope – China weathered 
the crisis much better than traditional markets. 
•  Now as China slows down, concerns are expressed over falling 
into pattern of boom and bust commodity boom cycles, 
deindustrialization, rising currencies (Dutch-Disease) and 
overdependence on a single market like China 
•  Surge in investment from China also encountering local 
sensitivities about foreign ownership of agricultural land 
•  Initial hopes of manufactured exports to China largely 
disappointed. 
•  Much of initial excitement about increased interaction with 
China based on negative view of U.S. – this is now changing. 74 
Future Concerns 
Future problems for the region center around the fact that LAC’s 
economies are notoriously illicit and under taxed: 
•  Leaves governments without the fiscal resources necessary to 
invest in a better future 
•  China’s thirst for raw materials means the region will remain highly 
vulnerable to boom and bust cycles and external shocks 
•  Continuing low taxes and underinvestment in education, infrastructure, 
public services and technology means Latin America will fall further 
behind other regions – remain a second tier region. 
•  Economic crisis has exacerbated the difficulties in reaching a 
consensus for establishing long term goals and associated 
necessary reforms to break out of the resource cycle 
•  Illicit networks centered around drug trafficking are, in a vicious cycle of 
illegality, increasingly contaminating political and judicial systems in the 
region – prevent consensus building around long-term goals 
•  Painful cuts in public services and increasing crime and social tensions 
have made coalition building all the more challenging 
•  Result in many countries may be a vicious cycle of  short term political 
optimization resulting in sub-par, unstable growth and development 
Summing Up 
Key Points 
•  Emerging economies will outpace the growth of the advanced 
economies. This disparity in growth has only been exacerbated by 
the financial crisis 
•  Slow growth in the US and Eurozone will cause a continued shift in 
Latin American trade to Asia 
•  Latin America’s recent improved growth performance is 
encouraging , but largely based on favorable commodity prices – 
most countries still very vulnerable to external shocks. 
•  LAC grow growth prospects are relatively favorable providing they 
can move ahead with improvements in governance and economic 
reforms 
•  China’s role in Latin America has the potential to contribute 
significantly to growth through providing expanded investment – 
China state banks have lent more than $75 billion to the region 
since 2005.   
•  China’s rise in the region provides more competition for the U.S., 
but the US still has a number of long run advantages such as 
security assistance, cultural ties and market for many Latin 
American non-commodity exports. 76 
End 
•  Thank you – Questions? 
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